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INTRODUCTION
In April of 2010, Facebook announced that it had 500 Million users.2 Ten years prior, the Internet itself had a smaller subscribership.3
It is apparent now more than ever that Facebook, like the Internet, is
here to stay. It is not a fad or niche, but rather something that is becoming increasingly ubiquitous in all spheres of society, including
one of our most revered institutions: the judiciary.
Unlike the typical Facebook user, legal professionals are bound
by ethical codes. 4 Doctrines of legal and judicial ethics not only guide
actions relating to the representation of clients and the adjudication of
disputes, but also govern conduct outside the courtroom.5 These ethical rules exist to both police the profession and uphold the integrity of
our judicial system.6 Straying from these rules can lead to disciplinary
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action against the legal professional and, at times, more severe legal
repercussions.7
Members of the judiciary, as arbiters of fairness in our society, are
held to a higher standard of ethical conduct than even attorneys. Beyond avoiding unethical behavior, judges and justices are required to
avoid the mere “appearance of impropriety.”8 However, the actual
facts underlying a member of the judiciary’s behavior are not dispositive. Behavior that causes a reasonable observer to subjectively perceive impropriety where none actually exists can still be grounds for
sanction.9 This standard reflects our society’s imperative to not just
ensure the integrity of individual judges, but to also preserve the image of the judiciary. 10
Facebook-use in the legal profession presents a plethora of ethical
issues. Many of these issues can be folded into existing interpretations
of ethical rules.11 This paper, however, focuses on one that cannot: the
Facebook friendship and the “appearance of impropriety” standard
imposed on members of the judiciary. We know that a judge presiding
over a case where his friends are involved would certainly give rise to
questions about appropriateness, and accordingly such an arrangement
is often proscribed.12 But would the same ever hold true when a judge
presides over a Facebook friend? This paper attempts to determine
whether there is a distinction, legal or otherwise, between an acquaintance and an acquaintance who is also a Facebook friend, and, specifically, if the latter is capable of creating the appearance of impropriety
when the former is not.
The judicial duty to avoid the appearance of impropriety has a
convoluted past and an uncertain future. What is already a murky doctrine becomes even more perplexing once one attempts to apply it to
behavior on Facebook. Neither the states nor the American Bar Asso7
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ciation have provided a clear answer as to what kind of behavior gives
rise to the appearance of impropriety. In this vacuum, we are forced to
reconcile the “appearance of impropriety” standard with Facebookuse and the growing prominence of social networking.
This paper explores the concept of the appearance of impropriety
and its implications on Facebook-use in the judiciary. Part I gives an
overview of Facebook’s growing presence in our society and covers
the salient features of the network. Part II describes the presence of
Facebook in the legal profession, and the problems it has caused and
continues to cause. Part III details the history of the appearance of
impropriety standard and, more specifically, how courts have applied
it to various kinds of friendships in the past. Part IV describes what
courts and ethical committees have already said about Facebook
friendships and the appearance of impropriety standard, and what they
will likely say, and should say, about Facebook friendships in the near
future. Finally, Part V offers suggestions for the American Bar Association’s future course of action.
I. IT’S A FACEBOOK WORLD
Facebook is a website that provides a means of social interaction
for its users. Users create a profile page, where they detail personal
information including their interests, relationship status, hometown,
affiliated employers and schools, all for the world to see.13 Perhaps
Facebook’s most salient and oft-discussed feature is the ability to
“friend”14 other users. Once two people become “Facebook friends,”
they generally gain increased access to each other’s profile page, although the extent of that access is subject to each user’s privacy settings. Generally, users will be able to see a friend’s photographs, profile information, Facebook “groups” she has joined, and, perhaps most
importantly, the notorious “Wall.”15 The Facebook Wall displays a
variety of content, including the user’s “status updates,” other users’
comments, and a virtual trail of the user’s recent activity on the site.16
And this is just on the standard Facebook Wall. If a user has experimented with any of the innumerable Facebook applications, his or her
13
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friends may be privy to even more intimate information, including, as
one application offers, the user’s current physical location.17
The modes of communication available to Facebook users are
numerous, for example, users can post comments on their friends’
Walls, the Walls of event pages, and the Walls of groups they belong
to. Furthermore, users can comment on other users’ comments,18 or
just opt to leave their mark by “liking” the post with a simple click.19
Users seeking more discrete conversations can send email-like messages to other users’ private inboxes20 , or engage in an instantaneous
Facebook “chat” with online friends who choose to enable the feature.21 Finally, those who are particularly shy can “poke” other users
and communicate without having to say a word.22
Looking at all of these features, one cannot help asking a question
that Facebook-creator Mark Zuckerberg loosely described asking
himself during the site’s nascency: who in their right mind would
“want to put any [personal] information on the Internet at all,”23 let
alone to the extent Facebook permits? Answer: everyone, apparently.
In July of 2010, Facebook announced that it had half a billion members.24 Additionally, Facebook users posted 30 billion photographs
and spend 700 billion minutes per month spent browsing the site.25
Facebook hits account for one out of every four webpage views in
America.26 Clearly, what started as a website for college kids now
17
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appeals to a far wider demographic.27 Men and women over 55 now
make up two of the fastest growing user-groups.28 With an estimated
50 million people joining Facebook each month, it is difficult to imagine any contingent resisting the trend.29
Social media is rapidly replacing other modes of casual communication. In 2009, the U.S. Postal Service reported that the volume of
first-class mail in December—excluding catalogs, packages, and junk
mail—had fallen eighteen percent from its 2002 peak.30 One writer
suggests that Facebook is the explanation.31 Christmas cards, long
used to update old friends on one’s life, lose their utility when those
people are Facebook friends.32 Facebook is quickly becoming the way
we keep in touch.
Another less fortunate reality of the Facebook era is that common
sense has frequently lagged behind the pace of social-networking innovation. For instance, many users have unwittingly blurred the line
between what ought to be public and what should stay private. One
writer observed that Facebook is beginning to “replace restaurants as
the go-to place for couples to cause a scene.”33 Many shameless individuals now use Facebook as a soapbox to berate their partners.34
Couples often exchange jabs via Facebook comments for all of their
friends to see, as the website “Lamebook” humorously catalogue.35
Facebook also gives the public a new way to scrutinize public figures. Politicians, for instance, have become painfully aware of the
downsides of maintaining an Internet persona. Numerous candidates
have been forced to deal with unbecoming photographs coming to the
public’s attention through either their own Facebook use or postings
by other users.36 One candidate even found himself apologizing for his
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college-aged son’s unremarkable underage drinking.37 And politicians
are not the only ones facing the repercussions of their Facebook footprints.38 One victim of this kind of negative Facebook publicity lamented that we all thought this day would arrive, “but that it would be
in 20 years, not in two years.”39
In 2006, Time Magazine recognized the profound impact of the
Internet by bestowing its coveted “Person of the Year” award to the
collective Internet user.40 A mere four years later, and Facebook had
apparently established its permanence: Time named Facebook creator
Mark Zuckerberg its Person of the Year, poignantly noting that
“Facebook has merged with the social fabric of American life.”41 The
Facebook age is here to stay; as for how the website fits into our social norms, rules, and laws, we still seem to be flying blind.
II. LEGAL PROFESSIONALS JOIN THE PARTY
As one would expect, some of those 500 million Facebook users
are lawyers and judges. A 2009 study showed that three-quarters of
the attorneys surveyed were members of a social network, such as
MySpace, LinkedIn, or (of course) Facebook.42 Attorneys, like many
professionals, have started to use Facebook not just in their own social
lives, but in their professional lives as well.43 For lawyers and judges,
Facebook is not just a tool to find an ex-girlfriend or an old high
school classmate; it is a way to network with other legal professionals.
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For the most part, state bar associations have welcomed, and even
ushered in, the new world of social networking. For example, the
Texas Bar Journal has published several articles encouraging attorneys to take advantage of Facebook. One article, written by a media
consultant, disparages firms that are guilty of “under-utilizing Facebook,” and holds up various firms with content-filled Facebook pages
as examples for the less tech-savvy firms to aspire to.44 The piece recommends posting videos of staff functions and starting discussions
that may interest clients.45 It concludes by encouraging law firms to
“experiment and figure out” how to best use social media to their
benefit.46
Another article in the Texas Bar Journal offers Facebook “do’s
and don’ts” for lawyers and judges, and is decidedly pro-Facebook.47
The article encourages lawyers to use the site to market themselves,
and to “exchange information and ideas with colleagues.”48 The article further recommends that judges use Facebook for “professional
development and political advantage,” opining that Facebook is a
cheap way to stay informed and “enhanc[e] public understanding of
the judiciary.”49 The article even advocates using the website to monitor the behavior of lawyers and parties appearing before the judge.50
The legal profession’s embrace of social networking sites has not,
however, been without setbacks. In 2008, an Illinois public defender
was fired for comments she made on her blog, where she disclosed a
client’s jail identification number and berated him for not ratting out
his drug-dealer brother. 51 Similarly, a prosecutor in San Francisco
was disqualified after using obscenities to describe his opposing counsel on his own blog.52 A blogging Florida attorney was also repri-
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manded for characterizing a judge as an “evil, unfair witch.”53 While
these blogs were available through independent websites, Facebook
provides its users with the ability to blog through its “notes” feature,
which is essentially the same concept.54
Facebook usage has already created its own issues for the legal
community. For example, in Texas, a judge denied an attorney’s request for a second continuance after seeing pictures of the lawyer
partying on Facebook.55 The judge originally granted the attorney an
initial continuance so that the attorney could tend to the supposed
death of his father.56 But after the judge saw the lawyer partying in
recent Facebook pictures, he was not so sympathetic when the attorney made a second continuance request.57
In another instance, a North Carolina judge was publically reprimanded for ex parte communications through Facebook.58 During a
child custody case, the judge “friended”59 the defendant’s attorney.60
The judge and the attorney then began exchanging messages about the
on-going case.61 Once this came to the attention of the plaintiff’s attorney, the judge was removed and a new trial was granted.62
Facebook’s impact on legal and judicial ethics has already been
considerably widespread, and there is no indication that Facebook
related issues will slow down in the near future. The profession must
begin taking deliberate steps to remedy the ethical issues created by
Facebook. However, the objective of this note is not to address every
issue presented by Facebook. Rather, the goal is to focus on one particular issue in the domain of judicial ethics.
III. JUDICIAL ETHICS IN THE GOOD OLD (FACEBOOKLESS) DAYS
53
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Facebook creates numerous implications for judicial ethics; however, this note only concerns one: the relationship between the appearance of impropriety standard and Facebook friendship. Specifically, the fundamental question this note addresses is whether a Facebook friendship can, or should, ever create the appearance of impropriety. But what is “impropriety”? Merriam-Webster broadly defines
impropriety as “the quality or state of being improper”.63 Given the
breadth of this term, just avoiding impropriety could be a heavy burden, but judges are required to do even more than that. They must also
avoid acting in a way that may cause a reasonable observer to believe
impropriety is afoot—regardless of whether the observer is right or
wrong.64 When established, the appearance of impropriety may force a
judge to recuse herself from a matter, require the judge to be disciplined, or even change the outcome of an already-decided case.65
To begin answering the question of whether Facebook friendships
can create the appearance of impropriety, it is first necessary to delve
into the background on the standard in the pre-Facebook world. This
background will serve as the foundation for relating the appearance of
impropriety standard to Facebook friendships. The notion that maintaining the appearance of propriety is almost as crucial as maintaining
propriety itself is not new. Long before the appearance of impropriety
standard was formally conceived in ethical codes, courts instructed
judges to avoid “the very appearance of evil,” regardless of whether
the judge was actually “honest in purpose.”66
63
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64
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65
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“abstain from the appearance of evil.” McKoski, supra note 65, at 1920 n.27 (citing
In re Harriss, 4 N.E.2d 387, 388 (Ill. 1936) (“[The 1924 Canons] were all succinctly
summed up by St. Paul centuries ago when he advised the Thessalonians to abstain
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However, to assess how Facebook friends fit into the appearance
of impropriety standard, we need not look so far into the past. The
development of the appearance of impropriety standard over the past
ninety-five years began with its formal inception in the 1924 Cannons
of Judicial Ethics. This section includes a brief history of the appearance of impropriety standard and a more specific examination of how
the standard has been applied to (non-Facebook) friends and acquaintances in the past. The relevant notions to gather from this section are:
(1) the appearance of impropriety standard’s increasing stringency
since its original articulation in the Canons, and (2) the reasoning
courts have used in applying the standard to various sorts of relationships.
A. The Appearance of Impropriety Standard’s Increasing
Stringency67
Kenesaw Mountain Landis was a federal judge in the early 1920s
who, wisely in his estimation, took a second job as a Major League
Baseball commissioner to supplement his modest annual federal salary of $7,500.68 His new position paid an additional $42,500 annually.69 Prior to Landis’ tenure as commissioner, the game had taken a
dark turn.70 Gambling and bribery were pervasive among major
league insiders, most notably the Chicago White Sox, who notoriously
threw the 1919 World Series.71 As commissioner, Landis wielded a
heavy hand against perpetrators, famously banning the accused White
Sox from the league.72 While the public hailed him as the “guardian”
from all appearance of evil.”); id. (citing Gantt v. Brown, 134 S.W. 571, 571 (Mo.
1911) (“Yet we can with profit heed Paul’s admonition: Abstain from all appearance
of evil.”)).
67
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of two comprehensive articles on the subject: McKoski, supra note 65, and Ronald D.
Rotunda, Judicial Ethics, the Appearance of Impropriety, and the Proposed New ABA
Judicial Code, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1337 (2006). Many of the footnotes in this section cite original sources and include some helpful quotes, but the original compilation of this research into historical narrative should, for the most part, be attributed to
one of the aforementioned writers.
68
Rotunda, supra note 67, at 1351.
69
Id.
70
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WORLD SERIES (1987)
71
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atmosphere of corruption surrounding baseball in the early 20th century, see ELIOT
ASINOF, EIGHT MEN OUT: THE BLACK SOX AND THE 1919 WORLD SERIES (1987).
72
Id. at 1922.
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of the national pastime, those in the legal profession raised ethical
questions about Landis retaining his seat on the federal bench while
simultaneously having such a position.73
However, Landis’ detractors could not find any law or ethical rule
prohibiting his dual affiliation absent an actual misdeed.74 Regardless,
the American Bar Association adopted a resolution censuring Landis.75 The ABA condemned Landis’ dual employment as being, even
in the absence of actual impropriety, a threat to the public’s perception
of a fair and impartial judiciary.76 The Landis ordeal became a major
catalyst for the ABA’s creation of the 1924 Canons of Judicial Ethics.77
In 1924, the ABA created a set of canons that encouraged judges
to refrain from professional or personal conduct that would raise questions about the integrity of the judiciary.78 Canon 4 enshrined the
spirit of the ABA’s censure against Landis. Titled “Avoidance of Impropriety,” the canon advised judges that their “official conduct
should be free from impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.”79 The remaining 1924 Canons elaborate on the general recommendations seen in Canon 4, advising judges, among other things, to
avoid relationships that “may reasonably tend to awaken the suspicion
that … [such] relations or friendships” are capable of affecting judicial actions.80
While the profession clamored for the Canons in the midst of the
Landis controversy, they largely remained dormant for decades following their creation.81 That changed in 1969, when another controversy again spurred the ABA into action. Supreme Court Justice Abe
Fortas received a consulting fee of $20,000 from the Wolfson Family
73
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JUDGE KENESAW MOUNTAIN LANDIS 197 (1998) (discussing United States Attorney
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75
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Canon 4 to avoid the appearance of impropriety underlies all of these things.
81
McKoski, supra note 65, at 1926.
74

JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & THE INTERNET

[Vol. 3:1]

Foundation in return for his help in planning various foundation activities.82 Louis Wolfson, the Foundation’s director, was under investigation by the Securities and Exchange Commission when the payment was issued, but Fortas only returned the money after Wolfson
was indicted.83 Fortas had violated no law, but, as with Landis, the
mere appearance of the Justice’s activities was enough to draw condemnation.84 After a flurry of criticism from the press, Fortas ultimately resigned from the Court.85
The ABA responded to the scandal by creating a committee,
headed by California Chief Justice Roger Traynor, to strengthen the
1924 Canons. Canon 4 in the 1924 Canons became Canon 2 in the
new “Model Code of Judicial Conduct,” and stated that “[a] judge
should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of
his activities.”86 That is, the standard was no longer only tied to “official conduct,” as in the 1924 Canons. Perhaps more importantly, the
1972 Code elevated the appearance standard to an enforceable rule of
judicial conduct, where before it had been only aspirational in nature.87
The Traynor Committee also made important changes to the disqualification rules. The committee expanded the limited scenarios
where judicial disqualification was required under the 1924 Canons.
The 1972 Code included a “catch-all” category of disqualification,
which required disqualification when “[the judge’s] impartiality might
reasonably be questioned.”88 In the Reporter’s Notes to the Code of
82
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question about the appearance of virtue on the court.”)).
85
McKoski, supra note 65, at 1928.
86
CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 4 (1924) (emphasis added).
87
Although this was not limited to the appearance of impropriety standard—
the entire code underwent this transformation. See Charles Gardner Geyh, Roscoe
Pound and the Future of the Future of the Good Government Movement, 48 S. TEX.
L. REV. 871, 878 (2007) (“Whereas the Canons of Judicial Ethics had been hortatory
pronouncements that judges were free to follow or not, the 1972 Code’s preamble
declared that the Code was intended to establish mandatory standards that new state
judicial conduct commissions and their respective supreme courts would be charged
with enforcing.”)
88
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C(1) (1972).
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Judicial Conduct, Professor E. Wayne Thode explained that “impropriety or the appearance of impropriety in violation of Canon 2” could
“reasonably lead one to question the judge’s impartiality,” and therefore warrant disqualification.89 Appearances were no longer just
something judges ought to keep in mind; they now carried the threat
of enforcement. As one commentator noted, “Appearances officially
became, and would continue to be, the heart of judicial ethics.”90
The crackdown continued. The ABA revised the Code again in
1990,91 further strengthening the appearance of impropriety standard.
The 1990 Code replaced the “should” in Canon 2 with “shall” to resolve any remaining questions about whether the Canon was aspirational or mandatory.92 The drafters expanded the commentary to
Canon 2 in several important ways. The new commentary explicitly
reiterated that the rule applied to professional and personal conduct
alike.93 Moreover, it stipulated that “the test for appearance of impropriety is whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds a perception that the judge’s ability to carry out judicial responsibilities
with integrity, impartiality, and competence is impaired.”94 One commentator described the appearance of impropriety standard after the
1990 modifications as “relatively intact, albeit considerably amplified.”95
The ABA suggested an overhaul of the 1990 Code during the
ABA Commission on the 21st Century.96 In response, the president of
the ABA created the Joint Commission to Evaluate the Model Code of
Judicial Conduct.97 The utility and fairness of the appearance of impropriety standard was the subject of much debate. Some members of
89
E. WAYNE THODE, REPORTER’S NOTES TO THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
60-61 (1973).
90
McKoski, supra note 65, at 1930.
91
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (1990).
92
Id. (“A Judge Shall Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety”) (emphasis added).
93
Id. at Canon 2A cmt. (“The prohibition against behaving with impropriety
or the appearance of impropriety applies to both the professional and personal conduct of a judge.”).
94
Id. (emphasis added).
95
McKoski, supra note 65, at 1931 (quoting LISA L. MILORD, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA JUDICIAL CODE 13 (1992)).
96
ALFRED P. CARLTON, JR., AM. BAR ASS’N, JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY: REPORT OF
ST
THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON THE 21 CENTURY JUDICIARY 57
(2003) (“The Commission recommends that the ABA undertake a comprehensive
review of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct.”).
97
McKoski, supra note 65, at 1931 (citing Mark I. Harrison, The 2007 ABA
Model Code of Judicial Conduct: Blueprint for a Generation of Judges, 28 JUST. SYS.
J. 257, 257 (2007)).
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the Joint Commission viewed the standard as being too vague to be
the source of discipline.98 A 2004 draft retained the “appearance of
impropriety” prohibition in Canon 1, but neglected to mention the
standard in the black-letter rules following the Canon.99 Moreover, the
commentary added that “[o]rdinarily, when a judge is disciplined for
engaging in conduct that creates an appearance of impropriety, it will
be in conjunction with charges that the judge violated some other specific rule.”100 This would have considerably scaled back the standard’s
force. Accordingly, many viewed the proposed changes to the appearance of impropriety as the neutralization of a core tenant of judicial
ethics.101 The ABA continuously reassured critics that the changes
were not intended to undermine the appearance of impropriety standard from the 1990 Code, but their argument was justifiably unconvincing.102 The structure and language in the 2004 draft were difficult
to reconcile with the strong language in Canon 2 of the 1990 Code.
However, the reality is that the 2004 draft more accurately reflected
the way most courts were actually applying the 1990 Code.103
After some back and forth between the Joint Commission and
outside critics, the ABA went beyond simply keeping the language of
the 1990 Code; it strengthened the appearance of impropriety standard
more than ever before. The appearance of impropriety standard be98
See id. at 1932 (“Members of the Joint Commission would toil for three
and one-half years over whether improper appearances should remain a basis for
judicial discipline or be reassigned to the status of an unenforceable aspirational
guideline.”).
99
See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (May 2004 draft) [hereinafter 2004 Draft], available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/judicialethics/draft_canon1_0
51104.authcheckdam.pdf. See also McKoski, supra note 65, at 1932 (“This omission
led many observers to conclude that the appearance standard was relegated to a hortatory status and could no longer form the basis of a disciplinary charge.”). To clarify,
in the original Canons of Judicial Ethics, the canons were all there was. In the later
codes, subsections appeared under each cannon, which, in the view of some, were the
enforceable parts of the Code. The 2007 Code made these subsections “rules.”
100
See 2004 Draft, supra note 99, Canon 1.01 cmt. 2.
101
See Rotunda, supra note 67, at 1356 (citing ABA JOINT COMM’N TO
EVALUATE THE MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, PRELIMINARY DRAFT,
INTRODUCTORY REPORT, June 30, 2005, at 4 (“A majority of commentators on the
subject … urged that the concept be retained …. “)).
102
McKoski, supra note 65, at 1932 (“ABA President Dennis Archer attempted to reassure critics by announcing that the Joint Commission had retained the
mandatory and disciplinary nature of the standard and did not transform it into anything less.”).
103
Id. at 1933. McKoski refers to, as one example, Indiana, where among the
ten opinions between 1987 and 2007 that relied on the appearance of impropriety
standard, none of them premised a violation solely on breaching the appearance of
impropriety. Id. at 1965.
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came part of Canon 1 in the 2007 Code, where it had been part of
Canon 2 in the 1990 version.104 Moreover, the 2007 Code included
Rule 1.2 under Canon 1, stipulating that “A judge shall act at all times
in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence,
integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety
and the appearance of impropriety.”105 The standard was formally
enshrined in a black-letter rule, in addition to its place in the canons.106 This left no question about the enforceability of a disciplinary
action premised entirely on the appearance of impropriety.
The expansion of the appearance of impropriety standard under
the 2007 Model Code is not without critics. Rotunda describes the
appearance of impropriety standard, particularly since the 2007 modifications, as being intolerably vague and exploitable.107 McKoski describes the 2007 Code as unfavorably “elevat[ing] the appearance of
impartiality over actual impartiality.”108 Their views, however, are
hardly universal. Other scholars have been critical of the judiciary’s
lenient take on ethical rules,109 and emphasize the many benefits of
the appearance of impropriety standard.110
To summarize, the appearance of impropriety standard began as
little more than a recommendation for how a judge should conduct

104
The appearance of impropriety had moved from Canon 4 in 1924 to Canon
2 in 1972, and then from Canon 2 to Canon 1 in the 2007 Code. This progression also
arguably evidences the standard’s increasing prominence. See MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (2007).
105
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2007) (emphasis added).
106
Id. See Eastham v. Holt, 27 S.E. 883, 894 (W. Va. 1897) (“Such excessive
power, though honest in purpose, should be denied because in unscrupulous hands it
might be used to further dishonest ends. To keep the fountain of justice pure and
above reproach, the very appearance of evil should be avoided.”).
107
See Rotunda, supra note 67, at 1361 (“Yet the ABA has armed every
disgruntled litigant with the means to tear down a judge’s reputation by arguing that,
‘even if what you did was not wrong, it appeared wrong to me, and so you violated
the appearance of impropriety.’”).
108
See Raymond J. McKoski, Reestablishing Actual Impartiality as the Fundamental Value of Judicial Ethics: Lessons from “Big Judge Davis”, 99 KY. L.J. 259,
290 (2010).
109
See Leslie W. Abramson, The Judge’s Relative Is Affiliated with Counsel
of Record: The Ethical Dilemma, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1181, 1200 (2004) (“Judges
may not recuse themselves as frequently as may be necessary to preserve public confidence in the judiciary.”).
110
See Cynthia Gray, Avoiding the Appearance of Impropriety: With Great
Power Comes Great Responsibility, 28 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 63, 101 (“The
appearance of impropriety standard, both as a symbol and an enforcement tool, is an
essential component of that effort and perfectly comprehensible by a thoughtful judge
and readily embraced by an upright judge.”). See also McKoski, supra note 65, at
1962 (discussing many of the arguments for an appearance of impropriety standard).
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herself in a professional setting.111 It essentially laid dormant for decades, until the 1972 Code elevated it from a recommendation to a
mandatory requirement, and one that applied to all a judge’s activities,
not just professional ones.112 The 1990 Code further amplified the
standard’s strength by resolving some semantic ambiguities.113 However, regardless of the ABA’s increasingly stringent language with
respect to the appearance of impropriety, some questions still remained about whether the appearance of impropriety standard was
individually enforceable.114 The 2007 Model Code finally put the issue to bed, at least for the ABA, by adding the appearance of impropriety to Rule 1.2, and stipulating that all rules are individually enforceable.115 How states choose to implement and interpret the new
language of the 2007 Code, however, largely remains to be seen.116
B. Friendship
Standard

Under

the

Appearance

of

Impropriety

While the concept of impropriety is broad, the focus of this paper
is quite narrow. In investigating whether Facebook friendships are
capable of creating the appearance of impropriety, it is necessary to
discuss how courts and ethical committees have assessed real-world
friendships under the appearance of impropriety standard in the past.
Precedent on real-world relationships and the appearance of impropriety will provide a valuable framework for applying the standard to
Facebook friendships.
But, how do friendships create the appearance of impropriety?
Analyzing something that gives rise to the appearance of impropriety
is a matter of (1) identifying the potential underlying impropriety and
(2) discovering the conditions where a court or ethical committee will
111

See supra notes 72–85 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 86–95 and accompanying text.
113
See supra notes 96–100 and accompanying text.
114
See McKoski, supra note 65, at 1932 (“ABA President Dennis Archer
attempted to reassure critics by announcing that the Joint Commission had retained
the mandatory and disciplinary nature of the standard and did not transform it into
anything less.”).
115
See supra notes 101–111 and accompanying text.
116
Only a few states have modified their codes of judicial ethics to adopt the
ABA’s 2007 changes so far. See infra note 167. The Model Code of Judicial Ethics is,
of course, just a model code. States have to adopt the language in their own codes for
it to be enforceable. While almost all states have adopted the ABA’s past code
changes this has yet to happen with the 2007 Model Code. E.g., JEFFREY M. SHAMAN
ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS 3 n. 19 (3d ed. 2000) (stating that 47 states
adopted the 1972 Code after its promulgation). If the past is any indication, more and
more states will continue adopting the 2007 Code.
112
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find it reasonable for an observer to infer that such an impropriety
exists, even if it does not. Essentially, the potential underlying impropriety is the improper conduct that the judge would be guilty of if the
reasonable observer’s suspicions were correct. There can be no “appearance” of impropriety if the alleged conduct would not be improper even if proven. The second prong describes those circumstances where a court acknowledges that the potential underlying impropriety could be reasonably inferred, and therefore the judge’s conduct should be prohibited regardless of whether the potential underlying impropriety actually exists or not.
With respect to friendship and the appearance of impropriety,
there are two potential underlying improprieties. The first is that the
judge exhibits bias towards the friend or acquaintance in a proceeding.
This is perhaps the most intuitive, and the predominant focus of this
paper. The second potential underlying impropriety is that the judge is
not a particularly upstanding citizen; for example, the associate of
various nefarious characters. As for the conditions under which one of
these improprieties may be inferred, the bulk of the analysis, there are
no straight-forward answers.117
It is certainly not the case that every friendship gives rise to the
inference of impropriety.118 Unfortunately, there is not a single test to
determine whether the circumstances exist for a court to find the appearance of impropriety; the innumerable forms of social relations
necessitate a case-by-case inquiry.119 Moreover, different states reach
different conclusions about the appearances of various relationships in
similar circumstances.120 Still, there are several factors that states—
117

When judicial bias is the underlying issue, there is substantial overlap. For
instance, looking at the 2007 Model Code of Judicial Ethics, Canons 2 and 4 explicitly concern “impartiality,” while “impropriety” is defined in the code as “conduct
that undermines a judge’s … impartiality.” Perhaps one question is: “why address this
solely under the appearance of impropriety if the duty of impartiality is really what’s
at issue?” The reason is that this paper is concerned with addressing how courts will
look at Facebook friendships primarily absent proof of actual bias, and that is really
an “appearance of impropriety” question. Still, some literature discusses the “appearance of partiality,” which seems, at first glance, like it might be more relevant for this
topic. However, this concept is really a less-developed sub-category of the broader
appearance of impropriety standard. See infra note 120 (emphasis added).
118
E.g., Schupper v. People, 157 P.3d 516, 517 (Colo. 2007) (holding that the
“the mere existence of a trial court judge’s friendship with a member of a prosecution
team, by itself, does not create… the appearance of impropriety.”).
119
Id. (“[W]e must look to the specific circumstances of the case in order to
determine whether the closeness of that friendship … require[s] the judge’s disqualification.”).
120
This has produced an appearance of impropriety jurisprudence that is very
confusing. See, e.g. Rotunda, supra note 67, at 1369 (“This analysis[,]” referring to an
Ohio ethics opinion on the appearance of impropriety, “is about as helpful as John

JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & THE INTERNET

[Vol. 3:1]

with at least some consistency— use to assess friendships and determine whether it would be reasonable for an observer to infer that a
potential underlying impropriety exists. 121 Courts determine whether
or not the mere existence of a specific relationship is capable of creating the appearance of impropriety by evaluating the factors of closeness, control, and disclosure.
1. Closeness
Predictably, one factor courts and ethical committees consider is
the “closeness” of the friendship. Certain relations are so close that
they obviously create the appearance of impropriety.122 Family members, business partners, lovers—these relationships require little explanation when a court finds a violation of the appearance of impropriety standard. Accordingly, judges have been relatively good about
recusing themselves in a timely fashion when these kinds of relationships are at issue.123 However, there is a different class of relationship,
of which the Facebook friendship is arguably a part, which occupies a
Wayne’s advice: ‘A man’s gotta do what a man’s gotta do.’” (other citations omitted)).
121
While we see many of these factors used across various states in similar
circumstances, that is not to suggest there is uniform interpretation of social relationships under the appearance of impropriety standard. Often there are gross inconsistencies with the application of the standard, even in the same state. See, e.g. Jeffrey T.
Fiut, Recusal and Recompense: Amending New York Recusal Law in Light of the
Judicial Pay Raise Controversy, 57 Buff. L. Rev. 1597, 1622 (2009) (discussing
countervailing holdings on the appearance of impropriety and social relationships in
New York).
122
See In re Pekarski, 639 A.2d 759, 762 (Pa. 1994) (holding that “because of
the impossibility of conveying the extent of that relationship “the judge should have
“preliminarily recused herself[.]”); In re Turney, 311 Md. 246, 247 (Md. 1987) (censuring a judge for presiding over an individual who was his former wife’s stepson and
the friend of his own son because it created the appearance of impropriety); see also
Leslie W. Abramson, The Judge’s Relative Is Affiliated with Counsel of Record: The
Ethical Dilemma, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1181, 1186 (2004) (“An appearance of impropriety is created by the close nature of the marriage relationship.”).
123
A search on LexisNexis reveals very, very few cases concerning recusal
and familial or business relationships. Perhaps the closest is In re Turney, supra note
122. See also Leslie W. Abramson, Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 79
MARQ. L. REV. 949, 968-70 (1996) (discussing other cases involving close relationships and the appearance of impropriety). Generally, cases concerning the appearance
of impropriety and these kinds of relationships arise because the relationship calls into
question whether the judge can continue to hold office at all. E.g., Smith v. Beckman,
683 P.2d 1214 (Colo. App. 1984) (holding that a county judge’s marriage to a deputy
district attorney created the appearance of impropriety, even though she only handled
matters in the district court and took great lengths to insulate herself from county
court cases).
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gray area. Investigating how courts and ethical committees have assessed these sorts of relationships in the past will shed light on how
they will treat Facebook friendships in the future.
One way courts have considered the closeness of a relationship is
by looking at the present level of social involvement. In Schupper v.
People, Sanford Schupper, who was accused of felony theft, filed
several motions to disqualify Judge Larry Schwartz, but Schwartz
denied them all.124 Schupper was convicted, and subsequently appealed.125 During appeal, Schupper moved to disqualify Schwartz
from four independent criminal cases filed against him.126 This time
Schwartz granted the motion, on account of his former supervisor
having recently entered the case on the side of the prosecution.127
While Schwartz “consider[ed] him a friend,” he had “little social involvement at present.”128 Still, he admitted, “under these present circumstances it would create an appearance of impropriety if I retain
these cases.”129 The issue was whether the disqualification should be
retroactively applied to Schupper’s prior conviction.130 In adopting the
per se rule, the trial court held that the “mere existence of the friendship required disqualification.”131
After reversal in the appellate court, the Supreme Court of Colorado rejected the per se rule for a more fact-intensive alternative. The
court stated that whether disqualification was required depended on
“the closeness of the relationship and its bearing on the underlying
case.”132 For the court, Schwartz’ friendship with the member of the
prosecution was insufficiently close because of the two had “little
social involvement at present.”133 The court held that a friendship
“devoid of current social involvement” did not rise to the level of
closeness capable of creating the appearance of impropriety.134

124

Schupper v. People, 157 P.3d 516, 518 (Colo. 2007).
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Tensions had risen considerably between the Schwartz and Schupper’s
attorney, even before the appearance of Schwartz’ friend. Schwartz described the trial
as becoming “something of a personal grudge match.” Id.
130
Id.
131
Id. at 520.
132
Id. (emphasis added).
133
Id. See also United States v. Lovaglia, 954 F.2d 811, 816 (2d Cir. 1992)
(stating that while the judge and victim’s family had been “very close socially,” it was
“important that [they] view[ed] [the friendship] in its temporal context.” The judge
had no contact with the victim’s family for around eight years prior to the case.).
134
Schupper, 157 P.3d at 520-21.
125
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In the same vein, a Louisiana court assessed the closeness of a
friendship by looking at the frequency of communication between a
judge and a third party. Daniel O’Neill sued a building owner, Newton Thibodeaux, for injuries sustained by falling over a railing.135 After a verdict for Thibodeaux, O’Neill motioned for a new trial, alleging that the trial judge should have disqualified himself because he
occasionally attended card parties with Thibodeaux and one of the
witnesses.136 The court of appeals found no error for several reasons,
chief among them “[t]he fact that the trial judge plays cards with Thibodeaux several times a year” did not constitute a close enough relationship to require disqualification.137 Essentially, the court found that
an acquaintance consisting of infrequent contact through a game of
cards was not close enough to create an appearance of impropriety.138
This same framework appears in judicial ethics advisory opinions.
The Delaware Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee responded to a
judge inquiring about whether he could hear emergency ex parte petitions from the Division of Family Services given his friendship with
one of the lawyers representing the division.139 The question was
whether the judge could hear petitions from other lawyers in the division.140 The committee pointed out that merely identifying the friend
as “close,” as the judge did in his initial letter, was not enough to determine whether the appearance of impropriety existed.141 Upon further investigation, the committee found that the judge and lawyer socialized frequently, and the lawyer sometimes babysat for the judge’s
children.142 Ultimately, the court found that the judge presiding over
other lawyers in the division did not create ethical problems.143 Importantly, the committee assessed closeness of the friendship by focusing
almost entirely on the frequency of social interaction.144
2. Control

135

O’Neill v. Thibodeaux, 709 So. 2d 962, 964 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1998).
Id. at 965.
137
Id. at 968.
138
Id.
139
Del. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., JEAC 2002-2, at 1 (Feb. 27, 2002).
140
Id. at 2. (The judge correctly assumed he could not preside over proceedings actually involving the friend. Doing so would have certainly created the appearance of impropriety.).
141
Id. at 4.
142
Id.
143
See id.
144
See id.
136
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Courts and ethical committees have not limited their analysis to
the relationship itself; the context of the relationship is also highly
relevant. Sometimes the creation and continuation of an acquaintance
is more a product of the social atmosphere than it is the volitional
choice of the parties involved. In other words, certain circumstances
can make one’s friendships or acquaintances practically inevitable,
and therefore the prohibition of such relationships would be unfairly
burdensome. The degree of control a judge has over the creation and
continuation of a relationship is something courts and ethical committees have given considerable weight.
Some courts have placed emphasis on geographical factors and
considered the practicality of mandating recusal for certain kinds of
relationships. The court in O’Neill v. Thibodeaux did not focus solely
on the closeness of the relationship between Judge O’Neill and his
card buddies. The size of the city where the parties resided was also
instrumental in the court’s decision.145 The Louisiana court commented that “it would be impossible for a judge to remain aloof in
small towns … where most people know each other.”146 Essentially, if
the kind of acquaintances at issue in the case demanded recusal,
judges in small towns would have to recuse themselves from virtually
every case, since in small towns, “most people know each other, especially the judges.”147 The court thought a finding that the relationship
between the judge and Thibodeaux met the appearance of impropriety
standard would effectively require judges to “live their lives in a vacuum.”148
In United States v. Heffington, five defendants appealed convictions for manufacturing methamphetamine.149 The defendants argued
that their Fourth Amendment rights were violated because the judge
who issued the warrant that exposed their methamphetamine operation
was not “neutral and detached,” as required by law.150 The judge had
145

See 709 So. 2d 962 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1998) .
Id.
147
Id. The procedure of the whole affair was also important to the court’s
decision. “At that time, the plaintiffs had the option to ask for the trial judge’s recusal,
explore the relationship on the record, or accept the trial judge for the duration. Plaintiffs were obviously content with the trial judge’s disclosure and their decision until
the trial concluded unfavorably to them.” Id. See also Jorgensen v. Cassiday, 320 F.3d
906, 912 (9th Cir.2003) (finding no appearance of impropriety because “Judge Munson is the only federal district court judge in the Commonwealth. It is quite likely that
Judge Munson is acquainted with most of the lawyers who regularly appear in his
court.”).
148
O’Neill, 709 So. 2d at 968.
149
United States v. Heffington, 952 F.2d 275, 277 (9th Cir. 1991).
150
Id. at 277-78 (citing Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 327
(1979)).
146
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represented one of the defendants in another case involving methamphetamine almost a decade prior.151 While the court did not directly
consider the appearance of impropriety standard, it did discuss the
closely related concept of the “appearance of partiality.”152 The size of
the community was one of the major focal points of the court’s assessment. For the Heffington court, the fact that rural judges inevitably
know more about local criminals than most of their urban colleagues
was insufficient to create an appearance of partiality.153 The court
quipped, “[W]e are not prepared to disqualify small-town judges on
demand.”154
Other courts have adopted a broader approach. In an advisory
opinion, the Alabama Judicial Inquiry Commission drew a distinction
between relationships that judges have some control over and those
that they do not, the former being those that generally create the appearance of impropriety.155 The Commission explained that “a judge
cannot control the church the friend attends or the stores at which the
friend shops,” and therefore judges should not be required to alter
their behavior to avoid the appearance of impropriety with respect to
those situations.156 Still, the Commission cautioned, a judge can “control the degree of his or her interaction with the friend in such public
venues” and should “make certain that his or her actions do not create
an appearance of impropriety.”157

151

Id. at 278.
Id. at 279. See also Leslie W. Abramson, Appearance of Impropriety:
Deciding When a Judge’s Impartiality “Might Reasonably Be Questioned”, 14 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS, 2001, at 55, 70 (Author describes the “appearance of partiality” as
essentially being under the umbrella of the appearance of the impropriety standard,
and suggests that the only distinction is that the “appearance of impropriety” refers to
a duty of the judges, where the “appearance of partiality” refers to the right of third
parties to enforce that duty in one particular instance. Further, “To avoid the appearance of impropriety, the judge should be the first to raise the issue by recusing in a
particular case … [o]n the other hand, when a party seeks the trial judge’s recusal for
the appearance of partiality, appellate decisions are divided about whether the judge’s
personal views matter.”) (emphasis added).
153
See Heffington, 952 F.2d at 279.
154
Id.
155
Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm’n, Op. 97-657, ALABAMA’S LEGAL
INFORMATION CENTER (June 27, 1997), http://www.alalinc.net/jic/opinions/ao97657.htm. See also Moran v. Clarke, 296 F.3d 638, 649 (8th Cir. 2002) (focusing on a
judge’s “reciprocal visits” with a friend).
156
Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm’n, Op. 97-657.
157
Id. See also Steven Lubet, Judicial Impropriety: Love, Friendship, Free
Speech, and Other Intemperate Conduct, 1986 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 379, 387 (1986) (arguing
that there is a distinction between private behavior and public behavior, the latter
being what a judge has greater control over).
152
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The Alabama Commission relied heavily on a New Jersey case in
its reasoning, which itself provides insight into this theory. In In re
Blackman, the Supreme Court of New Jersey reprimanded a judge for
the appearance of impropriety because he attended the wrong cookout.158 Judge Robert Blackman, with apparently nothing but good intentions, attended Thomas Heroy’s Mother’s annual Labor Day cookout.159 This was problematic because Thomas Heroy had recently
been convicted of racketeering.160 Although the two men had been
friends for years, the court premised Judge Blackman’s reprimand on
his choice to attend the cookout.161 The court noted, “When a judge
chooses to attend a party hosted by a convicted criminal, [it] could be
perceived as evidencing sympathy for the convicted individual or disagreement with the criminal justice system that brought about the
conviction.”162 It was the judge’s choice to attend the cookout—rather
than the prior existence of the relationship—that created the appearance of impropriety; the judge was powerless against the fact that his
friend had committed a crime, but he could control whether or not he
attended the barbeque.
3. Disclosure
Finally, courts have considered whether the judge disclosed the
relationship at issue prior to a dispute. Generally, disclosure serves to
supplement the court’s analysis—it does not automatically absolve
any appearance of impropriety, nor is lack of disclosure necessarily
fatal.163 Unlike the other two factors, disclosure is not so convoluted
as to require detailed discussion. For the purposes of this paper, it
suffices to say that disclosure is sometimes required,164 and always
158

In re Blackman, 591 A.2d 1339, 1340 (N.J. 1991).
Id.
160
Id.
161
Id. at 1341, 1342.
162
Id. See also id. at 1342 (“His presence at the party was the subject of public scrutiny, not his feelings of friendship for Heroy.”).
163
See, e.g., Abramson, supra note 152, at 69 (“When a judge fails to disclose
information to the parties that the judge knew or should have known, this failure to
disclose could provide the basis for a motion to disqualify. However, the case law is
split on this issue. Some cases suggest that an appellate court should remand the
case…. Other courts have concluded that failure to make a timely disclosure either
does not raise an appearance of partiality or renders an ethical violation effectively
harmless.”).
164
E.g., Stevenson v. State, 782 A.2d 249, 257 (Del. 2001) (finding that
“[w]henever there are facts or circumstances, however, that have the potential to
create the appearance of impropriety or partiality, a judge must disclose those facts
promptly…. “).
159
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helpful to the judge’s case.165 As one would expect, most issues with
the appearance of impropriety standard arise when a judge neglects to
disclose a relationship.166
IV. FITTING FACEBOOK FRIENDSHIP INTO THE
APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY STANDARD
This section merges the discussions on Facebook friendships and
the appearance of impropriety standard, and attempts to answer three
separate questions: (1) what have courts and ethical committees said
about Facebook friendships and the appearance of impropriety; (2)
what will they say; and (3) what should they say?
A. States That Have Spoken on the Subject
Several states have issued advisory opinions pertaining to Facebook use and judicial officers. These opinions provide probative value
in predicting the way courts will handle Facebook in disciplinary actions and cases, but it is still important to keep in mind their purely
advisory nature. While advisory opinions have some precedential
value, they are generally not binding in court.167 Moreover, each of
the opinions were solicited by judges voluntarily inquiring into
whether their own actions could give rise to discipline. As such, disclosure of the relationship at issue is inherent in all of the opinions,
and as previously discussed, courts view disclosure quite favorably.168
It is perfectly conceivable that even a jurisdiction with a relatively
lenient advisory opinion concerning Facebook friendships could come
down hard on a judge if an ethical case arose and there was no disclosure.
Florida has arguably been the most vocal about ethical problems
created by judicial Facebook friendships, and has certainly taken the
165
E.g., O’Neill v. Thibodeaux, 709 So. 2d 962, 968 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir.
1998) (holding that “[i]f we could find fault with the trial judge … it would be that he
did not make a record of his disclosure. However, [he] did make such a disclosure
prior to trial, albeit in chambers.”). See also Moran v. Clarke, 296 F.3d 638, 649 (8th
Cir. 2002) (remanding in part because the court found it “particularly worrisome
[that] the district court[] fail[ed] to disclose this conflict himself ….”).
166
E.g., In re Turney, 533 A.2d 916, 916 (Md. 1987).
167
Honorable Howland W. Abramson & Gary Lee, Judicial Ethics Advisory
Committees Should Render Opinions Which Adhere to Binding United States Constitutional Precedents, 41 DUQ. L. REV. 269, 269 n.1 (2003) (“In most jurisdictions, such
judicial ethics advisory opinions are not binding, but may be considered as a defense
or in mitigation of discipline.”) (citing J. SHAMAN, ET. AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND
ETHICS 1.11 (3d ed. 2000)).
168
See supra Part III(B)(3).
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strongest stance. As a preliminary matter, Florida’s Code of Judicial
Conduct differs from the 2007 Model Code. Florida’s Canon 2 stipulates that a judge “Shall Avoid … the Appearance of Impropriety in
all of the Judge’s Activities.”169 Subsections under Canon 2 enumerate
some specific instances Florida considers capable of creating the appearance of impropriety.170 The discussion on Facebook friendships
predominately focuses on Canon 2B, which states, in part, that a judge
shall not “convey or permit others to convey the impression that they
are in a special position to influence the judge.”171
The Florida Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee first considered
the issue in a 2009 advisory opinion, responding to a question about
whether a judge could “friend” lawyers who appear before her in
court.172 The Committee answered in the negative, stating that these
kinds of judge-lawyer Facebook friendships were enough to create the
appearance of impropriety under Canon 2B.173 The opinion lacked
lengthy substantive discussion, but the Committee did emphasize the
ability of the judge to control who her Facebook friends were.174
The Florida Committee reiterated its position and elaborated on its
explanation in another advisory opinion in 2010.175 Curiously, the
Committee acknowledged that in Florida, “[a] mere friendship between a judge and an attorney who practices before that judge, without more, does not create the appearance of impropriety,” while maintaining that “the majority continues to believe that allowing lawyers
who practice before a judge to appear as ‘friends’ on the judge’s
Facebook page … conveys the impression … Canon 2B prohibits.”176
169
Florida Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2, FLORIDA SUPREME COURT,
http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/decisions/ethics/09-152008_Code_Judicial_Conduct.pdf (last visited Sep. 10, 2011) (The structure is virtually identical to the 1990 Model Code of Judicial Conduct).
170
Id. at Canon 2B.
171
Id.
172
See Florida Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee Opinion 2009-20, SIXTH
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA,
http://www.jud6.org/LegalCommunity/LegalPractice/opinions/jeacopinions/2009/200
9-20.html (Nov. 17, 2009).
173
Id. (“The Committee believes that listing lawyers who may appear before
the judge as ‘friends’ on a judge’s social networking page reasonably conveys to
others the impression that these lawyer ‘friends’ are in a special position to influence
the judge.”).
174
Id.; see also supra Part III(B)(2) (similar to the “control” factor discussed
with respect to friendship).
175
See Florida Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee Opinion 2010-06, SIXTH
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA,
http://www.jud6.org/LegalCommunity/LegalPractice/opinions/jeacopinions/2010/201
0-06.html (Mar. 26, 2010).
176
Id.
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In a sense, the Committee found Facebook affiliation more troublesome than some real-world acquaintances. The Committee worried
that allowing these online friendships would “create[ ] a class of special lawyers who have requested this [friendship] status” that would
appear to have a special relationship with the judge, over those lawyers who decline to friend a judge or refrain from using social networking sites altogether.177 A minority opinion, however, expressed
reservations about extending the appearance of impropriety to Facebook friendships.178 The opinion also had vocal critics outside Florida.179
Under a virtually identical Code of Judicial Conduct, Kentucky
took a less rigid stance on the Facebook question. In an advisory opinion, the Kentucky Judicial Ethics Committee concluded that a Facebook friendship between a judge and lawyer who may appear before
her in court “by itself, does not reasonably convey to others an impression that such persons are in a special position to influence the
judge.”180 The Committee recommended that a judge should be “extremely cautious” with Facebook activity.181 The Committee described two “extremes” on the continuum of relationships between
judges and third parties, one a complete unfamiliarity with the person
outside the courtroom and the other a “close personal relationship.”182
At some point between these two extremes, the Committee explained,
the appearance of impropriety may arise; the implication being that
Facebook friendships could be capable of creating an appearance of
impropriety in some instances.183
Several other states have issued opinions similar to Kentucky’s. In
fact, Kentucky cited and relied on a New York ethics committee opinion, which likened adding Facebook friends to “adding the person’s

177

Id.
Id. (“Social networking sites have become so ubiquitous that the term
‘friend’ in the internet social networking world does not have the same meaning that
it did in the pre-internet age.”).
179
E.g., John Schwartz, For Judges on Facebook, Friendship Has Limits,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2009, at A25 (NYU’s Stephen Gillers addressed the Florida
Supreme Court ethics advisory opinion, and stated “In my view, they are being hypersensitive.” However, a Florida judge thought the ruling was “probably a good idea,
just to avoid any perceptions of impropriety.”).
180
Ethics Comm. of the Ky. Judiciary, Op. JE-119 (Jan. 20, 2010).
181
See id. at 5.
182
See id. at 2.
183
See id. (“[. . .] this Committee believes that judges should be mindful of
‘whether on-line connections alone or in combination with other facts rise to the level
of ‘a close social relationship’ which should be disclosed and/or require recusal.”)
(quoting N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct Opinion, infra note 184).
178
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contact information into the judge’s Rolodex.”184 The only difference,
according to the New York ethics committee, is the “public nature of
such a link … and the increased access that the person would have to
any personal information … creates the appearance of a stronger
bond.”185 Additionally, the Ohio Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline opined that a “social network ‘friend’ may or
may not be a friend in the traditional sense of the word.”186 Kentucky,
New York, and Ohio have all issued advisory opinions stating that
judges could maintain Facebook friendships, even with lawyers, so
long as it is—in the words of the Ohio opinion—”done carefully.”187
Notably, South Carolina has taken the most liberal stance, issuing
a very brief advisory opinion stating that a judge may “be friends with
law enforcement officers and employees of the Magistrate as long as
they do not discuss anything related to the judge’s position ….”188
This opinion, unlike the others, seems to entirely foreclose the possibility of a Facebook relationship itself ever creating an appearance of
impropriety.
B. Analogizing Past Doctrine
The advisory opinions concerning Facebook friendships are light
on substance189 and lack the kind of fact-intensive analysis seen in
other appearance of impropriety cases. State ethics committees have
only offered general recommendations about Facebook use with the
appearance of impropriety in mind. It is still unknown how courts will
apply appearance of impropriety precedent in an actual ethics case
184
N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct, Op. 08-176 (January 29 2009), available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/judicialethics/opinions/08-176.htm.
185
Id.
186
Ohio Bd. Of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline, Op. 2010-7 (Dec. 3,
2010), available at
http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/Boards/BOC/Advisory_Opinions/display.asp. Interestingly, Ohio’s stance is less-stringent, and yet it is the only state that has issued an
opinion on the topic and adopted the language of the 2007 Model Code of Judicial
Conduct. On the other hand, Florida has taken a stronger stance even though, on
paper, it has a less rigorous appearance of impropriety standard. This is a valuable
example of the ongoing interpretative difficulties with the appearance of impropriety.
187
Id. at 7.
188
S.C. Advisory Comm. on Standards of Judicial Conduct, Op. 17-2009
(Oct. 2009), available at
http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/advisoryOpinions/displayadvopin.cfm?advOpinNo=17
-2009.
189
All of the opinions discussed above address the broad question of whether
lawyers and judges can be Facebook friends, and, in turn, provide very general advice.
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involving Facebook. This section discusses the cases previously mentioned in Part III(B) concerning the appearance of impropriety and
friendship, and further investigates how courts may apply this precedent to Facebook relationships in the near future.
Based on how courts have assessed closeness in the past, Facebook friendships may create the appearance of impropriety even when
non-Internet acquaintances would not. In Schupper, the court did not
find sufficient “closeness” between the judge and the third party because the two had little present social involvement.190 Using this
framework, numerous real-world relationships fall outside the scope
of the appearance of impropriety.
However, Facebook complicates the issue. Friends or acquaintances who otherwise have little social involvement may routinely
contact each other on Facebook. The question becomes: at what point
do they become socially involved? Many Facebook friends continue
to keep in touch directly through Wall posts, Facebook messages, and
other Facebook features. Others keep in touch indirectly by tracking
their Facebook friends’ profile pages for updates over time. In either
case, there is certainly an argument that these types of Facebookfriend interactions preserve the social involvement of the two parties.
In the Facebook era, it is perfectly conceivable that courts using
the Schupper reasoning could find Facebook friendships create the
appearance of impropriety even when friendships have stagnated or
were never fully established. Fewer and fewer friendships fade into
the past when you can constantly communicate via Facebook, even to
the most casual of acquaintances. For instance, a birthday, once considered an intimate affair, has become an occasion when hundreds, if
not thousands, of Facebook friends send their best wishes. If “present
social involvement” is the measure of closeness, then Facebook
friendships are problematic. Facebook is, after all, a “social” networking site.
The court’s reasoning in O’Neill is likewise complicated by Facebook’s introduction into the equation. In O’Neill, the court held that
the occasional card game involving the judge and two individuals
involved in a case was not enough to create the appearance of impropriety because, in the eyes of the court, the nature and frequency of
the contact did not make the individuals sufficiently close.191 With
Facebook, people who rarely, if ever, interact face to face could communicate with one another quite frequently, whether it be by com-

190
191

See Schupper, 157 P.3d at 517.
See O’Neill, 709 So. 2d at 968.
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menting on, or “liking” a status, playing “Mafia Wars,”192 or via any
other of Facebook’s innumerable communication mediums. Furthermore, these Facebook interactions are, in some sense, even more intimate than the card game at issue in O’Neill. Meeting to play cards is a
group activity. Individuals can attend the same social gathering for
years with little direct interaction. Facebook interaction, however, is
generally one-on-one. Had O’Neill and Thibodeaux been Facebook
friends, it is certainly possible the case could have come out the opposite way. It would be difficult for the court to focus on the long gaps
between card games if they were punctuated with even casual Facebook contact.
Facebook friendships have become particularly troublesome for
those courts that focus on the level of control the judge has over the
relationship at issue.193 While a judge may have limited control over
his acquaintances within a small town,194 or with those who attend his
church,195 he has complete control over whether he creates a Facebook
profile and, if he does, who he “friends”. Even after approving a
Facebook friendship, the judge retains absolute control over his privacy settings—if he does not want anyone commenting on anything,
he can adjust his settings accordingly. With troublesome Facebook
friendships being unnecessary and easily avoidable, it is difficult
imagining courts that focus on the level of control in relationships not
faulting these judges for their purely volitional participation in Facebook.
Underlying this discussion is the fact that case precedent on the
appearance of impropriety comes from courts that relied on ethical
codes that do not resemble the 2007 American Bar Association Model
Code Model Code of Judicial Conduct. There is no question that the
2007 Model Code increased the stringency of the appearance of impropriety standard. In addition to being a canon of judicial ethics, the
2007 Code elevated the appearance of impropriety to a black-letter

192
MAFIA WARS BY ZYNGA, http://www.facebook.com/MafiaWars (last visited Apr. 4, 2011). Mafia Wars is an interactive Facebook game played amongst
fellow Facebook users. There are currently 17 million monthly active users, and this
is only one of a legion of similar Facebook games.
193
See supra Part III(B)(2).
194
See O’Neill, 709 So. 2d at 968 (discussing how the size of the judge’s
town, Eunice, factored into the court’s decision to find no appearance of impropriety).
195
See Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm’n, supra note 155 (“A judge is not in
violation of Canon 2 by attending the same church as the lawyer-friend. A judge
cannot control the church the friend attends or the stores at which the friend shops,
and should not be expected to change his church attendance and shopping in response
to this issue.”).
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rule.196 However, many states have yet to adopt these changes.197 As
more states begin to adopt the 2007 Code,198 they will not only have
existing precedent to rely on with respect to the appearance of impropriety, but also a new code that quite clearly promulgates a tougher
standard.
Some advisory opinions suggest Facebook friendships are sui
generis; however, it is difficult to imagine courts continuing to preserve such a distinction as Facebook falls into place among other
forms of conventional communication. The more integral Facebook
becomes to the social landscape of the world, the less likely it is that
states will be able to carve out an exception for Facebook friends under the appearance of impropriety precedent, particularly in light of a
newer and more stringent Code of Conduct. It is not a matter of if
courts will find Facebook friends capable of creating the appearance
of impropriety, but a matter of when.199
C. Normative Concerns
Even if one takes for granted that a Facebook friendship can give
rise to the appearance of impropriety under the factors provided by
precedent, a normative question remains: should it? The factors used
in prior cases to assess the appearance of impropriety exist only as
means to determine when it would be reasonable to infer actual impropriety.200 As previously mentioned, the specific impropriety inferred in most instances involving the relationship between a judge
and a third party is that the judge favors or disfavors the third party.201
If we know that Facebook friendships are, in actuality, incapable of
evoking this kind of bias, then perhaps Facebook friendships should
be permitted regardless of what an analysis under the precedential
framework would suggest.202
196

See supra Part III(A).
The cases discussed predate the 2007 Model Code and were predicated on
an arguably weaker standard. See supra Parts III(B)(1-2).
198
Some states have already adopted the ABA language from the 2007 Code.
See, e.g., OHIO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (2009), available at
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/LegalResources/Rules/conduct/judcond0309.pdf;
MARYLAND CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (2010), available at
http://www.courts.state.md.us/rules/reports/codeofjudicialconduct2010.pdf.
199
The impact will be considerable. See generally McKoski, supra note 65.
200
See supra Part III(B).
201
See supra Part III(B).
202
This argument concerns the “reasonable person” standard, which underlies
the appearance of impropriety. See McKoski, supra note 65, at 1931. “Closeness,”
“control,” and “disclosure” are factors that courts use to determine when it is “reasonable” to infer impropriety. See supra Part III(B), Sections 1 - 3. The point is that if for
197
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While precedent suggests that Facebook friends may be “close”
insofar as they satisfy criteria for closeness used by courts, there certainly is an argument that people subjectively think of Facebook
friends as something less than real-world acquaintances. Therefore, it
makes little sense to assume bias flows from Facebook friends in the
same way as it does from other “close” relationships. Such an argument is in line with traditional notions of favoritism: we exhibit positive bias towards those who we subjectively consider “close
friends.”203 However, evidence in the field of psychology suggests
that bias is not so simple, and in many instances, bias appears to have
little to do with subjective beliefs about how close a friend is.204
Instead, bias often arises in the form of “unconscious bias.”205
Factors that go far beyond those we use to determine the “closeness”
of a friendship are capable of bringing on this kind of bias.206 Psychologists have long studied the phenomenon of “in-group” bias,
which occurs when individuals consciously or unconsciously categorize others into groups, and then exhibit bias towards or against others
based on group membership.207 Studies have shown that individuals
are capable of constructing these groups based on the most insignificant common factors, and will continue to exhibit positive bias towards those they consider group members.208 In one study, the researchers divided individuals into groups based on a simple preference survey, and the subjects ultimately exhibited bias towards group
some other reason we know it is not reasonable to infer impropriety from a Facebook
friendship, then it should be permitted even if closeness, control, or disclosure
frameworks suggest otherwise.
203
See generally Marilynn B. Brewer, In-Group Bias in the Minimal Intergroup Situation: A Cognitive-Motivational Analysis, 86 PSYCHOL. BULL. 307 (1979).
204
See generally id.
205
See, e.g., Deana A. Pollard, Unconscious Bias and Self-critical Analysis:
The Case for a Qualified Evidentiary Equal Employment Opportunity Privilege, 74
WASH. L. REV. 913, 917-24 (1999) (“Part of the nature of ‘in-group/out-group’ dynamics is the tendency to see members of one’s own group as individuals, but outgroup members as an undifferentiated, stereotyped mass.”). In her article, Pollard
focuses on unconscious bias occurring in traditional racial and gender stereotypes,
while applying her general background knowledge of the phenomenon of unconscious
bias.
206
See, e.g., id. at 917 (“When traditional groups such as villages and tribes
broke down, people were inclined to classify themselves along race and class lines.”).
207
See generally Marilynn B. Brewer, In-Group Bias in the Minimal Intergroup Situation: A Cognitive-Motivational Analysis, 86 PSYCHOL. BULL. 307 (1979).
208
See, e.g., id. at 307-08 (describing a study where experimenters divided
eleven-year old boys arbitrarily into two groups. After the two groups were isolated
from one another for eight days, the “campers revealed consistent bias favoring members of their own group over members of the competing group.”).
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members even though there was no face-to-face interaction, no joint
task, and complete anonymity among members.209 That is, subjects
exhibited bias towards people they had never even seen or interacted
with, simply because those people indicated similar preferences on a
survey.210
This kind of data becomes worrisome when one considers that
one of the primary features of Facebook is the ability to track friends’
interests, affiliations, “likes,” and general progression through life.211
The Facebook user typically knows massive amounts of information
about each of his Facebook friends—far more than what he knows
about the average “real-life” acquaintance. With the availability of all
this information, users run the risk of unconsciously categorizing
Facebook friends into groups, and, in turn, exhibiting unconscious
biases based on these groupings.
For example, a judge who maintains a Facebook friendship with
an acquaintance might see that the individual, like the judge himself,
is divorced, loves the Cleveland Browns, and has read everything ever
written by James Joyce. The in-group bias research suggests that this
may be enough for the judge to impart a positive bias towards his
Facebook acquaintance. Even though the judge maintains little, if any,
communication with the Facebook friend, there is a possibility that he
will exhibit more preference to that individual than another acquaintance that he sees quite regularly but knows little about. That is, Facebook friendships may convey more bias in Facebook users than casual, real-world acquaintances do.
One response, however, is that introducing this body of knowledge into judicial ethics is a slippery slope. With unconscious bias in
mind, it would arguably be “reasonable” to find factors capable of
creating bias—and, consequently, the appearance of impropriety—in
a vast array of scenarios that go far beyond Facebook. If unconscious
bias is fair play, there is no limit to what individuals could argue creates the appearance of impropriety.212 Even so, this slippery slope
argument should be disregarded for several reasons.
Much of the expansion possible under this theory has already
been foreclosed by past courts’ emphasis on control. If a judge is not
accountable for any appearance of impropriety created by an acquaintance’s choice of where to attend a church service, it is unlikely a
court would discipline a judge for some small exhibition of uncon209

See id. at 309 for a more comprehensive explanation of the Tajfel study.
Id.
211
See supra Part I for an overview of Facebook’s various features.
212
See Pollard, supra note 205, for a discussion about unconscious bias in the
racial context.
210
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scious bias stemming from factors he has no control over. The rationale for including unconscious bias when evaluating Facebook usage
under the appearance of impropriety standard is precisely because
users have so much control. The bias may be unconscious, but it arises
from the judge’s voluntary choice to participate in Facebook’s social
network.
Moreover, the nature of Facebook is such that it invites not just
some trace amount of unconscious bias, but could potentially unleash
a torrent of hidden prejudices. Many of us know almost everything
about our Facebook friends, even those who we have little if any dayto-day interaction with. The hobbies, marital status, hometown, and
innumerable tastes and preferences of each Facebook friend are available on demand by simply clicking. We also learn a lot about a
friend’s traits involuntarily via constant updates in the Facebook
“feed.” Such an overload of information creates a unique risk for the
onset of unconscious bias.
In summation, psychological data on the phenomenon of unconscious bias suggests that Facebook friends are, in fact, something we
should be concerned about in assessing a judge’s Facebook use and
the appearance of impropriety standard. Given that Facebook is a controllable yet expendable part of one’s social life, it seems perfectly
reasonable to restrict judicial use of the site in order to prevent unconscious bias. Encouraging judges to abstain from creating a Facebook
profile, or at least from “friending” those likely to appear before them
in court, is hardly “unreasonably burdensome” or forcing them to
“live in a vacuum.”213 After all, “[a] judge should expect to be the
subject of public scrutiny that might be viewed as burdensome if applied to other citizens ….”214
V.CONCLUSION: CHANGING THE CODE
If, as the prior sections argue, states will—as they should—
ultimately find that Facebook friendships create the appearance of
impropriety, is there a need for the ABA or the states to change their
codes of judicial ethics? The answer is yes. As the advisory opinions
demonstrate, it is unlikely that states will move towards properly applying the appearance of impropriety standard to Facebook friendships at a uniform pace, and some may never do so at all. This will
create an aura of uncertainty and confusion that could be strikingly
similar to the treatment of the appearance of impropriety standard
213
214

See O’Neill, 709 So. 2d at 968.
See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 2 (2007).
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before the ABA’s 2007 Model Code. The ABA should take the initiative and resolve the impending confusion, as it has done with the appearance of impropriety standard.
But what specifically, can the ABA do? As previously recognized,
advisory opinions do not have sufficient weight to settle the matter.215
Further, establishing a “No Facebook” rule in the Model Code would
be incongruous with the other broader Code rules, and could raise
constitutional concerns.216 Perhaps the ABA’s best action would be to
modify the Model Code to include a comment on the subject. Under
Rule 1.2, the ABA should add a seventh comment, specifying that:
Friendships on social networking websites are capable of creating the appearance of impropriety. The best way to avoid
creating such an appearance of impropriety is to abstain from
maintaining a presence on social networking sites after taking
judicial office.
Such a simple and succinct comment would directly foreclose the
dozens of potential ethics cases that could arise concerning judges and
Facebook “friends.” Some in the legal community may grimace at
what would effectively be a “Facebook ban” for judges, but judges are
expected to make certain sacrifices that would be “burdensome if applied to other citizens.”217 Abstaining from participation in social networking is a small price to pay for the preservation of judicial integrity.
Conversely, continuing to allow Facebook use places judicial ethics jurisprudence on a convoluted path that may last for decades. Even
if the ABA refrained from discouraging Facebook use, several states
have already voiced concerns about judges and social networking.
History suggests it is only a matter of time before judges begin facing
disciplinary action for their Facebook usage. Courts may need years to
develop the appropriate appearance of impropriety standard in the
social-networking context. Furthermore, without clarity and direction,
the courts will continue to struggle to create a doctrine that is workable for the countless scenarios that may arise.
215

See supra note 167.
Certainly, a more direct way to avoid the appearance of impropriety would
be to ban judicial Facebook use outright with a black-letter-rule. However, doing so
could raise First Amendment concerns. As proposed, the comment language avoids
this issue while still clarifying that: (1) Facebook friendships can create the appearance of impropriety; and, (2) judges should consider avoiding social networking
altogether.
217
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 214, at 12.
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The only reasons courts have suffered through such a process with
real-world relationships is because, as a practical and constitutional
matter, states cannot ban judges from socializing. We do not have to
go down the same road with Facebook use. If the ABA makes it clear
that being a member of social networking sites can create ethical
problems under the appearance of impropriety standard, the vast majority of judges would close their Facebook accounts upon taking judicial office. As a result, we would have a judiciary that is both actually and apparently less biased. We do not need another century of
uncertainty surrounding the appearance of impropriety. The ABA
should take this opportunity to resolve this issue immediately.

